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   I will try to give a broad picture of Nishida Kitaro's ideas concerning creative artistic 
activity in the period of his Collection of Philosophical Essays (1933-1945). For him creativity is 
a characteristic of reality in all its domains: the world is creative,(') nature is creative, (2) and 
there is a creative evolution (3) from a primitive structure in constant metamorphosis. (a) Even 
though biological life is not yet creative, (s) the animal as a living being is creative. (6) In 
biological life the "fundamental creative principle" is the species and, as a historical species, 
the ethnos is creative. (') The world of history is also creative. Man is a maker, he is creative in 
his social concrete life: (8) his vital process is creative. (') 
    Man is a "creative", (10) "formative" (11) and "operative element of the creative world". (14 He is 
a "creative element of the historical world". (13) He is an operative U and formative element of 
the world of historical life. (15) Man is an active self, (16) a creative bodily historical self," an 
active-intuitive self.") The bodily historical self changes, constructs and creates the world of 
reality and is, in turn, created: his relationship with the world is creative. (19) Our poiesis is a 
"historical creative activity" through which "we contribute a brick in the construction of the 
eternal world". ~0) 
   Nishida in his later years studies "artistic creation - as a social historical formative 
activity - and the fundamental problems of aesthetics from the viewpoint of the philosophy 
of history". (21) He thinks that "man's artistic attitude towards the world must be clarified from 
the viewpoint of the historical formative activity". ~4 
   In order to consider artistic creation as historical formative activity, Nishida refers to the 
"development of art in primitive societies". (23) In doing this he falls back on the work Ancient 
Art and RituaP~ of the historian of Greek religion, Jane Ellen Harrison. The central point of 
Harrison's discussion in this work lies in the meaning, the difference and the relationship 
between the Greek words dromenon and drama. (25) Harrison addresses a second fundamental 
point: "when and how the dromenon, the done rite, becomes drama?". ~6) 
   Nishida reaches the conclusion that religion, art, science, the economy, and so on, not 
only originate in the dromenon but have, all and everyone of them, the character of dromenon. 
He carries his reflexion about the world of dromenon further, into the center of his thought, the 
topos, and writes: "Harrison says that the gods are born from the hotbed of the dromenon, but if
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we think this world of the dromenon deeply [enough], it must be a world of what I call self-
determination of the topos. As self-determination of historical space, different societies are 
constituted. Consequently, there is no [unique] way in the development of history". 
   For Nishida "art is [an] expression of historical life" ~' and particularly, it is an expression 
of tradition 0 and of culture. But by being such an expression, "the artistic style [...] must 
differ according to the ethnos and its environment". (30) 
   But to state that a tradition and a culture are expressed in styles which differ depending 
on the ethnos and its environment, means, above all, to take expression as a Mittel. The better 
to understand this, in section 1) we will first of all see the structure of mediation; in section 2) 
we will see the manner in which Nishida conceives of expression; and in section 3) we will 
have a glimpse of expressive mediation. Creative artistic activity is then seen in section 4) as 
expressive mediation, and in section 5) as social semiosis in a wide sense. 
1) Mediation 
   As Charles S. Peirce said in his last years: "All my notions are too narrow. Instead of 
`Si
gn', ought I not to say Medium?" csi) The wider aspect of the sign is "mediation", which has 
been defined "either as the synthetic bringing together or the normative regulation of plural 
elements". (32( This "mediation" is "the common characteristic of many natural and intentional 
phenomena not usually conceived of as semiotic". (33) 
   As Richard J. Parmentier says, "the notion of mediation can be defined as any process in 
which two elements are brought into articulation by means of or through the intervention of 
some third element that serves as the vehicle or medium of communication". (" For Nishida 
the elements to be articulated are the absolute contradictories, and the character of this 
articulation is dialectical self-identity. These contradictories are the three "domains" of 
historical reality: the absolute, the individual and the world. When Nishida thinks about 
mediation, he takes primarily the relationship between individual and individual (as elements) 
in historical reality. 
   We can think the true union of contradictories through the Mittel as self-negation of the 
true individual and self-negation and individualization of the true Mittel, "because we say that 
the individual is the Mittel and the Mittel is the individual, we can think the true union of 
contradictories". c3~ But Nishida asks about the character of this Mittel. (" His answer is that 
mutually independent things have mutual interactive relations in the Mittel. And the Mittel, as 
continuity of discontinuity of those mutual relations between independent things, determines 
itself and has the character of topos. And because the topos determines itself, the above-
mentioned interaction can take place. In this manner, in the Mittel that has the character of 
topos there is a dialectical unity and self-identity between contradictories. " Furthermore, 
"without the mutual determination between thing and thing, there is no Mittel, [for] there is no 
such `thing' as a mere Mittel". (30 
   Mediation in late Nishida philosophy has several aspects: a) self-mediation; (39) b) internal 
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mediation; (40) c) external mediation; (41) d) negative mediation; (4~ e) mutual mediation. " 
   f) Nishida says that in order for the "mutual mediation of mutually opposing `things"' 0 to 
be possible, there must be a Mittel. This Mittel, for Nishida, is Absolute Nothingness as self-
identity of contradictories. (45 But this is only one of the aspects of true Nothingess. In a wider 
sense, Nothingness is the Mittel and that "Mittel of Nothingness is a Mittel of historical 
objective expression".(") Nishida calls that world which is constituted through the self-identity 
of contradictories, the "world of the Mittel of absolute cothingness", and it is a "world [which 
is] mediated by absolute negation". " But in Nishida's logic of the topos, the Mittel is not only 
a function of the self-identity of absolute contradictories, it is also a function of reciprocal 
correspondence; it is not only the Mittel of absolute identity but also of absolute difference. 
   There are two further aspects of mediation: g) historical mediation, that is to say, all 
things - even conceptually mediated action - are mediated through the historical world, 
they are mediated in history. (44 All other aspects of reality are mediated through history in the 
historical world. The last aspect is h) social mediation, which means that all bodily historical 
praxis of man in the historical world goes through social mediation; and even all knowledge is 
mediated, for us, by social praxis. (49) 
   Basically, mediation lies in the topos of absolute Nothingness, in the topos of the un-
grounded historical reality. Because of this, the concept of expression is even more important 
in late Nishida philosophy. The sign is only one of the modes of mediation, or, as Parmentier 
says: "the sign is the most perfect exemplar of `Mediation' conceived as a generalized 
category". (50) And we should consider that the linguistic sign is only one of the types of signs. 
2) Expression 
   The subjectivism of the abstract conscious self which, according to Nishida is a 
characteristic of Western thought since Descartes, leads us to consider objects as mere 
vehicles of expression.(") For Nishida, on the contrary, the object, the historical thing, is not a 
mere sensible form that can become a sign: the historical thing itself is expressive. This 
viewpoint implies a maximization of the expressive character of all historical things. 
Expression in late Nishida philosophy is a chracteristic of historical reality. 
   In his later period, when Nishida interprets the infinite as historical reality, he refers to 
Royce's self-representative system as a "self-expressive system". (521 The world of historical 
reality is self-expressive within the process of its own self-perception. 
    In Nishida's late period, the un-grounded historical reality becomes a self-perceptive 
world, a world which Nishida assimilates to a system that maps itself unto itself. The infinite 
process of self-perception includes different aspects: self-negation, self-determination, self-
expression and self-formation. As one of the aspects of the self-perception of historical reality, 
this reality is self-expressive. Not only the historical world has an expressive character but it 
also includes within itself expressive relations; the expressive character of the historical 
world originates in the self-determination of the topos. (53'
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   The world forms itself through expression, its activity is creative expression, and all 
things in the historical world are expressive. (`~ Historical things are expressive,(") they are the 
Buddhist ji; (56) that is to say, they are the phenomenal aspect of absolute Nothingness and they 
are the paradigm or basic structure of the formation of the historical world." Consequently, 
the historical thing is active, expressive and social, (4 but unlike the human individual, the 
historical thing does not occur only once and it lacks a proper name. The historical thing can 
become our body, it can be considered as absolute event, and through our history forming 
bodily activity it becomes pragma. (59) And so, our body is "an organ of the self-expression of 
historical life" (60) and our active intuition is "Weltgeschehen ":(61) in active intuition we bodily 
give birth to the world. This is made possible because the Mittel "must be corporeal. We are 
born as self-determination of the corporeal Mittel". (62) As an active thing and as something that 
has been made, "each thing is absolute and, at the same time, this same thing embraces within 
itself its own self-negation and, negating itself, forms a system, it forms a world" (63) as self-
expression of historical reality. 
   Nishida presents another aspect of the self-expression of the world of reality when he 
says that to express is to represent. (64) Expressive activity is a "mode of expressive self-formation 
of the world". (65) When expression is representation, then "to make is to see", (66) and there we 
have the world of active intuition. There we have the social historical formation of reality 
through the bodily historical apprehension of things. So, exprimer = representer shows us 
another aspect of the self-expression and self-formation of historical reality and, at the same 
time, it shows us the expressive activity of the bodily historical poietic self. On the other 
hand, in the sense that mutually absolute contradictories symbolize each other, the identity of 
absolute contradictories is mutual transmutation. (67) This is the process of the historical world 
which has the character of identity of absolute contradictories: it is "metamorphose" : (64 
3) Expressive mediation 
   Between the afore-mentioned `domains' of the topos of historical reality there must be an 
"expressive Mittel" that mediates between them. The mutual determination between the 
individuals which are at the same time in historical reality, is the form of the mutual 
expressiveness among everything that forms reality. (69) 
   In expressive activity a self-representative world is constituted, and we can speak about a 
self-representative process of the world.(") In its deepest sense, in the formation and 
transformation of historical reality, the will and the representation of this world become one (71) 
through the human body. From this point of view, the expressive Mittel would mainly be the 
historical body of the active self: our body "is a body which has the character of expressive 
activity, it is an artist body". (72) 
   There are two self-identities which Nishida finds in Leibniz: exprimer = representer, and 
symboliser = transmuer. According to Nishida, pre-established harmony results from the 
interplay between these two self-identities and it makes possible the mutual transmutation 
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between absolute contradictories. This mutual transmutation constitutes their self-identity. (73) 
That which is symbolical expresses, and to express is to act with the character of expressive 
activity. ~7) The world takes itself as a Mittel and expresses itself symbolically. (75) Art, in this 
sense, would be a symbolic formation (76) as a transmutation operated in the world of historical 
reality. 
   In an ungriindlich, ungrounded reality, the topos of absolute Nothingness is the Mittel. That 
which is self-expressive, is such as self-determination of this expressive topos: "The Mittel of 
affirmation of absolute negation must be expressive". " Therefore, we can speak of expressive 
mediation. And the world is expressive "as self-determination of the expressive Mittel". " The 
same can be said about the individual [ko] as an element of the world. 
   Man's body, which according to Nishida must be thought of from the historical world, 
bears the mark of expression, it is "founded on the self-determination of the expressive world". 
(79) The historical body is such, not because of its temporality but because it carries upon itself 
the responsibility for the task of the historical world. It is a historical body because in it and 
through it is realized the self-determination of the expressive Mittel. In the action of the bodily 
historical active self, expressive mediation has a social character. 
   In short, even though things are expressive of themselves, they do not have an objectual 
substratum at their basis, that is to say, they are a-substantial. Consequently, their 
expressiveness is not inherent to a substance (which they lack), but is to be found in the self-
determination of a Mittel which is itself expressive. Furthermore, Nishida tells us that the 
Mittel is the topos itself of historical reality, and in the relationship between this topos and our 
historical body a mode of historical production is apprehended in each epoch of universal 
history. 
4) Creative artistic activity as expressive mediation 
   a) Objective expression as Mittel. In the last instance, the contradictories are mediated 
"neither externally nor internall
y; they are not mediated either with the character of unity of 
subject and object"(") because the Mittel is not Being but, rather, absolute Nothingness. The 
individuals in the historical world are mediated, in this sense, "by something which is 
absolutely transcendent", that is to say, they are "mediated by the creative expression of the 
social historical world". (81) That which is absolutely transcendent is something which 
"manifests itself creatively taking absolute Nothingness as its Mittel ". (821 This is what Nishida 
calls the "concrete word" or "objective expression". (83) That which is made is expressive as 
objective expression of life. (0 Because historical poiesis has objective expression as its Mittel, 
expression is found in it: "from poiesis comes the logos".(") Man's doing has as its basis the 
historical body: the historical body is expressive, and this historical body which forms and 
transforms historical reality is called by Nishida "logos-ic body":(") "our poiesis is mediated by 
absolute negation, that is to say, it is mediated by objective expression". (" The objective 
expression of the historical world is not only a "making' but also an "ought". (ss) But art is
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"sensuous" objective expression, in contradistinction to "volitive" religious expression. (89) 
   b) Expressive mediation in art. Nishida says that the topos of historical reality is an 
expressive Mittel, that is to say, "the space of the historical must be an expressive space". (90) 
And so, "in the world of art all things express themselves", poietically. (91) However, Nishida 
remarks that art is not a subjective poiesis: (9C "wherever there remains the least remainder of 
subjective poiesis, there is no art. Bergson says that not even the painter himself knows what 
kind of painting will result". (9) 
   The central point as regards expressive mediation in art could be expressed in the 
following manner: "ordinary life itself is, on one aspect, artistic" (M and insofar as art is 
expression and formation of social historical life, insofar as "art is the expression of historical 
life",(`) there is already expressive mediation. 
   In September 1941 Nishida rejects the idea that symbolization is the most basic process 
in art: "Japanese aesthetics must not be called mystical or symbolical: its core is the 
apprehension of the world in the instant of absolute present".(") That is to say, it is to be 
found in the self-expression of our historical life (0 as self-determination of the topos of 
historical reality. Then we can properly say that the work of art is a historical formative 
activity. Because for Nishida the world of art is constituted in the view-point of the formation 
of the world, which is reached when our self transcends itself "in the direction of the 
immanent pole of the world which has the character of self-identity of contradictories". It is 
the objectivation of subjective space and so, there is no symbolization but rather the 
presentation of the absolute character of expressive reality. (98) 
   In a later writing (February 1943) Nishida makes a precise distinction between the signic 
[kigo-teki ] and the symbolic [shocho-teki ]. He considers that both are abstract aspects as poles of 
the world of praxis: "the self-formation of our self, as self-formation of the historical world, is 
always reflected in these two aspects. Through its reflecting itself in the expressive signic 
[kigo-teki] aspect, the world of knowledge is constituted. On the contrary, through its 
reflecting itself in the symbolic [shocho-teki ] aspect, the artistic world is constituted". (99) 
   As an example I would like to quote a passage which refers to the architecture of the Ise 
Shrine. Nishida writes: "The Aegyptian people in its own environment formed the style of 
Aegyptian art. The Japanese people in its own environment formed the style of Japanese art. 
As [Bruno] Taut says, eternal beauty must be something [which results when] the work of art 
has fulfilled in the most pure and strong manner all the diverse requirements set by [the 
generality] of all things, which is its matrix. He says that the Partenon received the form of its 
proportion and contours in the transparent and clear Greek climate, and that the Ise Shrine 
looked for it in a climate which was warm and with abundant rains". 400) 
   Nishida refers also to other arts in his Collection of Philosophical Essays: music US) 
painting 402), poetry U03). And we can understand his intense interest in the creative act of the 
artist, in artistic creative activity, because he himself practiced poetry (tanka and haiku) and 
calligraphy.
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5) Creative artistic activity as social semiosis 
   In his late period we can see the fullness of Nishida's thinking about artistic creative 
activity. Artistic creative activity is, above all, an event in the historical social world, it is 
construction, formation and transformation of historical reality. We should not forget the force 
of art in social construction: 004) that which has been created transforms its creator. (16 This event 
of formation and transformation of historical reality expresses the content of the social 
process, because poiesis is not merely the subjective action of an individualistic self. 
   Artistic creative activity bears the mark of active intuition (for Nishida they are not 
equivalent) and, as such, it is a mode of that which Nishida expresses as "to become the thing 
[and] to see, to become the thing [and] to make" (IQ which is only possible as a social event: we 
socially become the things 40 themselves. Just as in the case of knowledge, creative artistic 
activity is also a social historical poiesis. 
   Artistic creative activity is a system of social historical mediation: it expresses, 
symbolizes, represents and transmutes the social historical formation and transformation of 
reality. That is to say, it is not merely an exchange of abstract meanings or intellectual codes. 
It is not purely intellectual understanding but, rather, it is social historical Erlebnis: it is 
poiesis, it is the self-determination of the Mittel of absolute Nothingness, which is expressive. It 
is creation of historical reality, and it is one of the innumerable creative lines in the curvature 
of historical space. 
   Artistic creative activity is a social historical Erlebnis of the traditions and cultural forms 
of an ethnos and its environment. Each ethnos, following its epoch and its environment, creates 
works of art which differ from those of other ethnia which have different traditions and cultural 
forms. 
   Last of all, we have come to see that art is one of the many modes of mediation, and that 
each art is a form of expression of a different aspect of social historical reality. From what 
has been said up to here, we can also say that creative activity is social semiosis in a very 
wide sense.
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